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ASCENSION AND ECCLESIA 
AND READING THE FATHERS* 
Peter Widdicombe 
Department of Religious Studies 
McMaster University, Hamilton 
T he doctrine of the ascension, often undervalued and often misinterpreted, has not, Farrow argues, been accorded its proper place in the history of Christian 
thought. Ascension and Ecclesia, a broad ranging and stimulating historical and 
systematic study, will do much to provoke reflection on the subject. The number of 
writers covered in the book is remarkable — it deals with the biblical texts and a host 
of writings from the principal periods of church history, both Eastern and Western — 
and comment after comment about theologian after theologian opens up new per-
spectives on their thought. Farrow contends that the failure of the Christian tradition 
fully to appreciate the ascension has had disastrous consequences for its understand-
ing of the church and the eucharist, and, more broadly, for its understanding of crea-
tion and God's relation to it, of time and eternity. His central thesis is that the eucha-
rist grounds the church and not, as is often assumed, the church the eucharist. It is 
only within the context of the eucharist that the church can be correctly thought 
about, but in turn, the eucharist can only be correctly thought about if the importance 
of both the presence and the absence of the bodily ascended Jesus is recognized, or, 
to use a phrase from Calvin that Farrow favours, if it is recognized that Christ is in a 
certain manner present and in a certain manner absent. 
Farrow believes that the church today has more difficulty coming to terms with 
Christ's humanity than with his divinity : we look past the ascended Christ's human-
ity and focus on his divinity. The tendency to disregard Christ's humanity leads to the 
substitution of the church for Jesus, which obscures the church's ambiguous status 
and leads to triumphalism, institutionalism, individualism, and a host of attendant 
problems. This tendency is rooted in the dualistic thought of Origen and Augustine, 
* A review article of Douglas FARROW, Ascension and Ecclesia : On the Significance of the Doctrine of the 
Ascension for Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1999. This review article 
is based on a presentation given as part of a book review panel on Ascension and Ecclesia at the Canadian 
Theological Society conference, at the Learneds, Université Laval, 26 May, 2001. 
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and the book is devoted to tracing a line running from them through the main figures 
in the history of Christian thought to those in the modern age who, Farrow maintains, 
came closest to getting it right, namely, Barth and Torrance. The one Christian 
thinker who stands out as an exception to this dark history is Irenaeus, the one theo-
logian we can take as a sure guide for our thinking about the ascension. 
Although the richness of Ascension and Ecclesia warrants the discussion of many 
topics, both methodological and substantive, this article will deal with Farrow's 
approach to the Patristic materials — in particular, his reading of Origen, Augustine, 
and Irenaeus — and his understanding of the development of doctrine in the early 
church. I shall argue that in his attempt to make the writings of these three Fathers fit 
his theory, Farrow gives a skewed picture of each and underestimates the complexity 
of the way in which doctrine took shape in the early church. On the one hand, how-
ever dualist Origen and Augustine may be, their conception of God as three and of 
God's relationship with creation is much more dynamic than Farrow allows ; and 
they both have a more positive view of creation generally, and humanity and its 
bodily nature in particular, than Farrow would have us believe. On the other, however 
positive a view Irenaeus had of creation, his doctrine of the Trinity is not sufficiently 
developed to sustain the doctrine of the church Farrow attributes to him, a doctrine of 
the church, which, in any case, is based on an unexplained modern conception of 
reality as relational. I shall begin my analysis with where Farrow thinks the tradition 
went wrong, with Origen and Augustine, and then turn to Irenaeus. 
Farrow's characterization of Origen's thought as a whole is shaped by his accep-
tance of the view of a previous generation of Origen scholars that Origen's thought 
was largely driven by Platonic/Neoplatonic concerns.1 Farrow contends that for 
Origen "diversity and pluriformity per se were already signs of a defection from the 
divine unity which creation ought more perfectly to reflect. Nor would we be wrong 
to link such a view to deficiencies in his concept of God. The trinitarian thinking we 
found in Irenaeus recedes rather than advances, unable to compete with a powerful 
stress on sheer oneness as the proper basis of divine transcendence" (p. 91-92). In the 
footnote to this statement, Farrow remarks that "This transcendent unity is not the 
relational unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, though there is such, but is finally the 
ineffable oneness of the Father alone" (p. 92). Origen's God is a God of apathy. The 
deepest roots of his conception of God lie not in salvation history, but in the opposi-
tion between the one and the many. His worldview was constructed along dualist 
lines and he associated only the rational with the truly real. The fall is a fall into 
fleshly existence and evil is connected with the spatio-temporal world. Farrow points 
out that while for Origen matter is good because it is the gracious provision of God, 
salvation he sees in part as a matter of leaving behind the grosser things of this mate-
rial world, including the grosser nature of the body. Thus, the restoration of all things 
will entail the safe return of "all spirits" to "the realm of pure rational being from 
their sojourn in a strange land" (p. 93). Origen appears to have thought that Christ did 
1. For a recent review of Origen scholarship, see Joseph TRIGG, "Origen and Origenism in the 1990s", 
Religious Studies Review, 22 (1996), p. 301-308. 
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not ascend in the body ; and he drives a wedge between the human Jesus and the 
divine Christ. The problem of the presence and the absence, Farrow maintains, "be-
comes rationalized and internalized, together with the ascension itself. It becomes a 
question of the cultivation of a spiritual mind, of the fine-tuning of the inner person to 
the invisible reality, and is no longer bound up with the matter of a man's departure 
and return" (p. 100). 
On the one hand, Origen's dualism leads to an ecclesiology deeply rooted in in-
dividualism (evidenced by the growth in the number of monastic houses, which were 
often heavily Origenist),2 as the Christian turns inwards in the search for unity with 
the hidden Logos. This generates in turn a privatisation of the sacraments and sacra-
mental nominalism. On the other, this dualism leads to institutionalism : "The trans-
ference of spiritual leadership from the official presbyterate to the enlightened, 
contrary to Origen's intention, leaves room for an increasingly pragmatic and politi-
cized view of the former" (p. 103). Farrow concludes that with the ecclesiology of 
Origen, "we catch a glimpse of what will later manifest itself as the Janus-like char-
acter of the Christian church : the alienation from the world which it often encourages 
among the saints, and the rapprochement which it seeks as an institution" (p. 105).3 
Farrow's understanding of Origen's thought, however, shows little acquaintance 
with the studies of such recent Origen scholars as Williams, Torjesen, Osborne, 
Edwards, and Widdicombe. The Origen that emerges from the studies of these schol-
ars is a thinker more guided by Christian revelation than Farrow allows. Oneness is 
not the starting point for Origen's conception of God and God's relation to creation. 
As I have argued in both the first and the revised editions of my book The Father-
hood of God from Origen to Athanasius, "For Origen, the terms for thinking about 
God were those of the scriptural narrative. It was the God there identified as Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit, the God who acted towards the world in the incarnation of 
Christ and the sending of the Spirit that had to be accounted for. Salvation lay in the 
proper apprehension of these things."4 Torjesen, in her ground breaking 1989 study of 
De Principiis, "Hermeneutics and Soteriology in Origen's PeriArchôn" argues that 
while Peri Archôn is cast in the traditional classical form of a treatise on first princi-
ples, it was intended to a be a handbook for the reading of Scripture.5 The metaphys-
ics of the three Christian principles, laid out mainly in the first book, provide the 
conceptual framework for the extended discussion of doctrines and their scriptural 
basis, which are found throughout the work. And Mark Edwards has recently re-
2. A claim that Farrow treats as self-evident. 
3. It is notable that Farrow makes little reference directly to Origen on the question of the church and the 
sacraments, relying instead largely on comments from the secondary literature, which themselves do not 
discuss the topic directly. Origen had a rather more complex understanding of the process of salvation than 
Farrow acknowledges, one in which the church played a significant role. Farrow makes no mention, for 
instance, of the importance for Origen of the church as the context for the interpretation of Scripture, 
scriptural interpretation being fundamental to how Origen thinks the soul comes to a knowledge of the Son 
and so to the Father. (On this, see, for instance, Karen TORJESEN, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theologi-
cal Method in Origen's Exegesis, Berlin [coll. "Patristische Texte und Studien," 28], 1986, p. 45 and 122.) 
4. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 1994 ; quotation from rev. ed. (2000), p. ix-x. 
5. In E.A. Livingstone, ed., Studia Patristica, Leuven, 1989, p. 333-348. 
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marked that Origen's theology is "as biblical as any" ; God, for Origen, "is present to 
us only through the historical epiphanies of his Word."6 Scripture is the necessary 
starting point for access to a knowledge of God and the starting point is not super-
seded. 
It is true that for Origen the Son is subordinate to the Father, but Farrow's state-
ment that it is to Origen "more than anyone else that we owe the hegemony of a far 
too narrow notion of the Father as ap%r| or ai/cta the Son as kôyoç or divine reason ; 
of the Spirit as the source of inner light which liberates one from the pitfalls of mate-
rial existence," a conception which he thinks had an influence on the Nicenes (p. 92), 
is far too simple. Origen was the first to argue for the eternal generation of the Son 
and to attempt to provide a conceptual and linguistic basis to support the idea. Fur-
thermore, his conception of the relation between the Father and the Son was one in 
which there was real plurality and mutuality — he writes, for instance, of the delight 
that the Father and the Son eternally take in each other.7 As Williams has observed, 
Origen "hints at a fundamental datum of later Trinitarian thought — that the Father-
Son relation is simply part of the definition of the word God, and so does not exist for 
the sake of anything else than itself."8 The Nicene Athanasius, drawing on Origen's 
conception of the relationality of the Father and Son, and arguing for the co-equality 
of the Son with the Father, was, in effect, to posit that datum. He for the first time in 
Christian thought contended that the content of the divine relation was love and that it 
was that that accounts for the act of creation, for the goodness of creation, and for its 
redemption.9 As we shall see, we do not find such a developed sense of the relational 
nature of the Trinity and its content with Irenaeus. 
At the heart of Origen's soteriology lies the notion of God's fatherhood.10 Salva-
tion lies in the apprehension of divine fatherhood and it is principally through the 
incarnation that we come to this knowledge. Indeed, to address God as Father in 
prayer can only be done because of the incarnation. It is as we love the Son, that we 
progress from knowing God as Lord to knowing him as Father, from the condition of 
slavery to that of sonship, from a relationship characterized by fear to a relation 
characterized by love.11 This affective element in Origen's thought, which reaches 
from his doctrine of God to his understanding of salvation, Farrow ignores in his 
commitment to the notion that Origen's God in its Neoplatonic shaping is apathetic. 
Osborne nicely draws out the fundamental difference between Origen's conception of 
divine transcendence and that of the Neoplatonists : in his conception of divine 
philanthropia as a love "that stoops to the level of humanity to the extent of assuming 
sin and death, and that shows no prejudice, respecting the fallen as well as the 
6. "Christ or Plato ? Origen on Revelation and Anthropology," in Lewis AYRES, Gareth JONES, éd., Christian 
Origins : Theology, Rhetoric and Community, London and New York, 1998, p. 11-25 (p. 11). 
7. In De Principiis 1.4.4 ; IV.4.1, and elsewhere. See the discussion in WIDDICOMBE, The Fatherhood of God, 
rev. ed, p. 90-91. 
8. Arius : Heresy and Tradition, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1987, p. 139. 
9. WIDDICOMBE, The Fatherhood of God, rev. ed, p. 184-187 and 206-209. 
10. See the whole of the first half of ibid. 
11. Ibid., p. 93-91. 
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great,"12 which is expressed most acutely in the incarnation, Origen departs decidedly 
from the Neoplatonists, for whom such philanthropia is incompatible with the tran-
scendence and independence of the One (p. 280).13 
What then of Farrow's view of Origen's attitude to bodily, material existence ?14 
On the question of whether the eternal rational souls are clothed in the body when 
they return to their creator and remain in that condition, Farrow's argument is 
opaque. On the one hand he seems to allow that the body, suitably altered, will not 
simply be abandoned in the resurrection, but on the other he is unconvinced by 
Edwards' argument15 that Origen believed that we do permanently retain our bodies 
(p. 95). But whether the body for Origen is permanent or not, Farrow maintains that 
for Origen it will have been "purged by the soul of everything that pertains to our 
bodies" (p. 95). He provides no evidence from the Origen texts, however, to support 
the charge. As Dawson simply observes, for Origen, for the soul to be soul, it requires 
an appropriate body.16 In On Prayer 31.3, referring to heavenly bodies, Origen 
remarks that "it would be exceedingly stupid if anyone were to think that, like stat-
ues, it is only their outward appearance that has a human form and not their inner 
reality." And in a passage from Methodius of Olympus, one of Origen's severest 
early critics, Methodius says that Origen believed that "the marks which are charac-
teristic of the physical quality" of the dead "remain constant ; it is because of the 
preserving of this quality that scars caused in our youth persist in our bodies, and so 
with other peculiarities, moles and similar marks."17 The apostle Paul, after all, had 
reckoned that the body had to be transformed, that flesh and blood could not inherit 
the kingdom of heaven, and Origen's reading of 1 Corinthians 15 in both De Princi-
piis 11.10 and Contra Celsum V.18 are entirely consistent with this. 
It is true, as Farrow points out, that there is a sentence in On Prayer 23.2 where 
Origen says that we are to think of the ascension of Jesus to the Father, "in a manner 
more befitting his divinity, that is, as an ascension of the mind rather than of the 
body." The obvious interpretation of this is that Origen did not think that Christ 
retained his body in the resurrection. It is just possible, however, that he did not mean 
quite what he appears to mean by mind and body. Edwards explains that when Origen 
is referring to human beings in their heavenly condition "The saint remains a com-
posite of body, soul, and spirit, but as body and soul are purified, the whole of him 
12. "Neoplatonism and the Love of God in Origen," in Robert DALY, éd., Origeniana Quinta Leuven 
(coll. "Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium," 105), 1992, p. 270-283 (p. 278). The 
word philanthropia is not used by Plotinus at all and Porphyry does not use it of God. 
13. OSBORNE, "Neoplatonism and the Love of God in Origen," p. 280. 
14. The subject is less than straightforward partly because the textual basis on which it was traditionally said 
that Origen denied the resurrection of the body is suspect — the texts which seem to point in that direction 
were generally attributed to Origen by his enemies, something Farrow does not take up. See Mark 
EDWARDS, "Origen No Gnostic ; Or, On the Corporeality of Man," Journal of Theological Studies, 43 
(1992), p. 23-37. 
15. Mark EDWARDS, "Origen's Two Resurrections," Journal of Theological Studies, 46 (1995), p. 502-518. 
16. "Allegorical Reading and the Embodiment of the Soul in Origen," in Lewis AYRES, Gareth Jones, éd., 
Christian Origins : Theology, Rhetoric and Community, London and New York, 1998, p. 26-44 (p. 42). 
17. Quoted in DAWSON, "Allegorical Reading," p. 42. 
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can be subsumed in the name of his highest part"18 and perhaps we are seeing some-
thing of that here. 
Although at points Farrow seems more favourably inclined to Augustine than to 
Origen, he concludes that in the end the contribution of Augustine represents a sec-
ond backwards step. He argues that in such early works as the Confessions, in which 
the Neoplatonic rot which affects all his works is especially evident, the physical and 
social natures of church are not recognised as they would be later. But this is to paint 
too black a picture of Augustine's thinking about the church in the earlier work. In 
the Confessions, Augustine portrays the church in a deeply positive way as the on-
going object of the dynamic trinitarian action of God and as reflecting that action 
within its life. His emphasis in the Confessions on the plurality of the church is seen 
in the intensity with which he argues in Book XII for the necessity of the communal 
nature of scriptural interpretation ; indeed, in Book XIII for the necessity of commu-
nal engagement in the church's governance of itself through the episcopal structure ; 
and in this latter book, in his celebration of the diversity of gifts within the church. 
All of this is, as Augustine perceives it, a reflection of the actions of Father, Son, and, 
especially, the Holy Spirit within the community of believers. There are, as well, 
numerous passages in the narrative account of the first nine books in which the 
communal and plural nature of the church is drawn attention to. Following 
Augustine's conversion, for instance, when Monica and he are caught up in their 
vision of transcendent wisdom in Book IX, it is notable, in contrast to his solitary 
Platonist vision of Book VII, that Augustine describes this as communal experience. 
Similarly, in Book IV, when Victorinus is finally prepared to confess his faith, he 
insists that be baptized in public in the body of the church and not privately. 
In my reading, then, the Confessions is consistent with the De Trinitate, where it 
is clear that the unity that the church has both here and in heaven will not be won at 
the expense of variety. In Book IV.29 of the De Trinitate, for example, Augustine 
explains that the particular work of the Holy Spirit is the giving to the various peoples 
of the earth their own languages to enable them to sing the praises of the glorified 
Christ. This concern to affirm the importance of the on-going plurality of the church 
is seen too in the final words of the De Trinitate (BookXV.51). There, Augustine 
affirms the church's belief in the plurality of the godhead and asks forgiveness for the 
infelicities of his attempt to explain it, and in particular, for his over-speaking and 
imprecision. But this is how he ends the work : "So when we attain to you, there will 
be an end to these many things which we say and do not attain, and you will remain 
one, yet all in all, and we shall say one thing praising you in unison, even ourselves 
being also made one in you. O Lord the one God, God the Trinity, whatsoever I have 
said in these books that is of you, may those that are yours acknowledge ; whatsoever 
of myself alone, do you and yours forgive. Amen." Augustine, aware of his limita-
tions, places his work and its evaluation in the hands of God and the church. While 
there will be an end to the many things which we say and do not attain, we shall do it 
as a "we" and the God who is one is also three and all in all. For Augustine, the 
18. "Origen's Two Resurrections," p. 506. 
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church in its unity is also plural, and in its plurality it is also a unity, just as is God, 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
But for Farrow, the later works, like the early ones, although less Platonic, con-
tain a fundamentally flawed conception of the ascension and, accordingly, of the 
church. Farrow's attack on Augustine's understanding of the ascension and its eccle-
sial implications turns on his interpretation of Augustine's use of the "prescriptive 
maxim, per Christum hominem ad Christum deum. This maxim rests on the assump-
tion that the humanity of the Word has no greater purpose than to lead us to his 
divinity, an assumption equally well-suited to an Origenist agenda as to the Nicene" 
(p. 119). Farrow concludes that for Augustine the "bodily ascension, though affirmed, 
is for the first time assigned an essentially negative value or function" and Christ's 
human nature perceived to be necessary "only 'for our weakness'" (p. 120). In the 
light of this interpretation of the significance of the maxim for Augustine, Farrow 
adduces numerous passages from the Augustine corpus in support of his argument, 
many of which at first glance seem to be innocuous enough,19 and this understanding 
of the maxim underpins his analysis of Augustine's totus Christus doctrine. The 
ubiquity of Christ's divinity, which the abandonment of his humanity allows, leads to 
the consequent identification of the earthly church with the heavenly and thus to 
ecclesiastical institutionalism and triumphalism. But is Farrow's interpretation of the 
maxim correct ? In support of it, Farrow quotes a passage from Sermon 26420 in 
which Augustine says of the disciples that "they would think of him as God [only] 
when his human nature would be removed from their eyes, so that, with the intimacy 
which they had formed with his human nature thus severed, they might learn to 
consider his divinity in the absence of his humanity" (p. 119-120). But the textual 
evidence is not quite as straightforward as Farrow assumes : there are texts in which 
Augustine appears to affirm that Christ retains his humanity eternally. 
In a suggestive article in Modern Theology, Breidenthal argues that Augustine's 
Christology is a neighbour Christology and fundamental to this is the idea that Christ 
retains the body.21 It is not superceded. However ambiguous his early statements on 
the subject may be, it is clear from various of his later writings that Augustine plainly 
believed that Christ ascended with the body. Although it is less clear whether he 
thought Christ retains it beyond the point of the last judgment, Breidenthal contends 
that it can be shown that he does. Commenting on Tractates on the Gospel of 
John XIX. 18, "The form of the servant will disappear. It presented itself in order that 
it might execute justice. After passing judgment Jesus proceeds leading with him the 
body of which he is head, and offers the kingdom to God. Then the form of God will 
be plainly seen — that form which could not be seen by the wicked, on whose ac-
count the form of the servant was displayed," Breidenthal argues that "Augustine 
19. P. 120. 
20. Dating possibly from as early as 387. See the discussion in Sermons III/7, trans, by Edmund HILL, and ed. 
by John ROTELLE, The Works of Saint Augustine, New York, New City Press, 1993, p. 233-234. 
21. Thomas BREIDENTHAL, "Jesus is My Neighbor: Arendt, Augustine, and the Politics of Incarnation," 
Modern Theology, 14 (1998), p. 489-503. What follows is largely drawn from Breidenthal. The translation 
is Breidenthal's. 
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identifies the divine form of Jesus with this appearance as the 'head' or 'principle' 
informing the community of believers. His manifestation as divine Word is at the 
same time the manifestation of the church as his body."22 Accordingly, in Contra 
sermonem arianorum 37 (34), Augustine rejects the notion that the body is laid aside. 
Why should we be surprised that the Son is subjected eternally to the Father, he 
remarks, "seeing that the human form remains in the Son [forever], and that the 
Father is always greater than this human form ?" When the form of the Son that is 
Christ's humanity passes away, and his divinity "is plainly seen," it is the multitude 
that he offers to the Father that constitutes his body.23 Christ judges us not only as the 
one who as divine judges with authority, but as the one who in retaining his human 
nature judges as one who is in solidarity with us. Breidenthal observes that the act 
whereby the divine Word joined himself to our humanity is irrevocable. The human 
form is not eclipsed by the divine. Rather, it is projected outward, becoming identi-
fied with the community of believers who make their appearance as the body of 
Christ. Augustine means this quite literally : the fellowship of believers is the human 
flesh and the human soul, the human form, of the divine Word.24 
Farrow might well respond that the identification of the human form with the 
community of believers simply confirms his view that Augustine identifies the church 
too closely with Christ, thus obscuring the ambiguity of the church's status. But while 
it might lend itself to such an interpretation, it points rather in the opposite direction : 
humanity in its full expression is permanently conjoined with the divine. Creation and 
its goodness here is recognized and given its due weight ; and, while I have not 
argued the point in detail, this, it seems to me, is a reflection of Augustine's general 
attitude to creation : in its goodness and order it reflects the trinitarian nature of God, 
a relation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in which love is eternally given and re-
ceived. The incarnation is not only assumed because of our weakness. At the very 
least what we must say is that Augustine's thinking about the created order and the 
body of Christ is more complex than Farrow appears to think. 
Farrow's Irenaeus is a much different theologian than either of the other two Fa-
thers. Sensitive to the nature of the Bible as historical narrative and allowing his 
thought to be guided by "Jesus-history" — the life and passion and heavenly interces-
sion of Jesus — Irenaeus, Farrow contends, was not prone to allow his thought to be 
shaped by abstract Hellenistic philosophical speculation and his theology is not 
fundamentally dualistic. In his anti-Gnosticism, Irenaeus repeatedly affirms the 
goodness of the created order and the closeness of God's relation to it. For Irenaeus, 
in contrast to Origen, the '"Father of all' is already in his transcendent simplicity the 
triune God, who with his two hands — Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit — 
is well able to embrace the world, and has in fact done so. [...] He is wholly other 
and genuinely accessible at the same time" (p. 48). This is not a God of apathy. What 
is more, those who would know this God, "must engage with him, not by some vain 
22. Ibid., p. 495-496. 
23. Ibid.,p. 496. 
24. lbid.,pA91. 
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effort to ascend to him in their minds, but by obedience to one who in the incarnation 
has already adapted himself to them. [...] For in the last analysis we can speak of 
God 'only according to the love we bear him.' Tvcoaiç is relational, not simply ra-
tional. Knowledge of the triune God is by nature personal and communal, which is to 
say, ecclesial" (p. 48-49). This last point is one that both Origen and Augustine would 
have been happy to affirm, but, as we shall see below, with this language of "rela-
tional" and "personal," Farrow has a specific context of reference in mind. 
Irenaeus' affirmation of the goodness of human nature and the human body is 
grounded in his understanding of the incarnation. Farrow concludes of the doctrine of 
recapitulation that "in his own undivided person he [Christ] becomes the guarantee of 
the unity and the goodness of all God's works, and of the continuity between creation 
and redemption" (p. 53). In "teaching the coherence of all things around the incarnate 
Word, Irenaeus was safeguarding not only the integrity of Jesus but the integrity of 
every particular ; that is, he is postulating a creaturely unity which does not exclude 
the plurality of our human personhood or of our bodily existence" (p. 55). This 
attitude to the human body, and, indeed, the whole of created reality, is further at-
tested by Irenaeus' celebratory affirmation that in the age to come all will be present 
with God in the heavenly realm and all will be fruitful. 
Irenaeus gave temporal and eternal new meanings. "In the light of the ascension 
of Jesus, the eternal is something to which the temporal may aspire without aban-
doning its temporal nature. There is in fact a creaturely form of existence that is fully 
engaged with God, open to the inexhaustible possibilities generated by communion 
with God" (p. 50). This engagement is brought about through the descending and 
ascending of Christ who thereby makes room for the Spirit in fallen creation and 
room for man in the presence of God ; "he draws the Spirit into man and man into the 
Spirit." Redemption is a "prising open of creation to the Spirit of God" rather than a 
"prising apart of creation to liberate what is divine in it" (p. 83). This issues in a 
church characterized by a sense of its provisionally. "On the one hand, the ascension 
[...] highlights the discontinuity between the present world and the word to come. On 
the other hand, ascension in the flesh, as the bishop puts it, demands that we under-
stand the former as something incorporated and perfected by the latter. Continuity 
and discontinuity are held in tension — the very same that belongs to the eucharist" 
(p. 46). Aware of this tension, the church is subject neither to triumphalism and 
institutionalism, nor to legalism. Aware both of the goodness of the world and the 
need for the world's transformation, the church refuses either to withdraw from the 
world or to become conformed to it. 
Farrow draws out well the richness of Irenaeus' commitment to the bodily ascen-
sion of Christ and the implications of this for Irenaeus' conception of the eucharist. 
But his description of the nature of the life of the church that results from this is less 
satisfactory. It is dogged both by a failure to define the concepts critical to the discus-
sion and by an anachronistic reading of ideas back onto Irenaeus' ecclesiology. In the 
opening pages of Ascension and Ecclesia, Farrow claims that the church is a "new 
ontological reality" (p. 6), but, although he uses the word ontological time and again 
throughout the work, and frequently in his analysis of Irenaeus' ecclesiology, in 
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which the church is said to be a "community with a highly distinct ontology," at no 
point does he explain what he means by the term. He does, however, give us a sense 
of what is distinctive about this ontology : it is a "relational ontology based on the 
gift of the Spirit. That which makes man man is not to be found in the soul or 
intellect, but in a uniquely communal modus vivendi [...] in the actual lives of human 
beings insofar as they live out the possibilities for communion granted to them by the 
Spirit" (p. 59). Irenaeus develops in various ways "the point that obedience, love, and 
communion are the most fundamental of ontological categories" (p. 65). What this 
issues in is a "perichoretic form of existence" which is "based in the perichoretic 
power of the Spirit" (p. 66). 
It is clear that Farrow here is following Zizioulas in the assumption that, as 
Farrow has it in a quotation from Zizioulas' Being and Communion, "being and 
relationship must be mutually identified" (p. 60) ; that "personal relations" are "the 
most fundamental and constitutive dimensions of creaturely reality" (p. 82-83). This 
is an assumption that has, of course, been widely adopted by many contemporary 
writers on the Trinity, among them Moltmann,25 La Cugna,26 and Gunton,27 who 
attribute the origin of the idea to the trinitarian writings of the Cappadocians. Farrow 
appears to think that this conception of the nature of reality requires neither explana-
tion nor justification. This way of discussing the nature of being and personhood (and 
the attribution of it to the Cappadocians), however, has increasingly come under 
criticism by such scholars as Coakley28 and Harris.29 Farrow shows no awareness of 
this. But whatever one is to say about the intelligibility of the idea, it is not at all clear 
that one can say, as Farrow does, on the basis of such statements as that quoted above 
— "we can speak of God 'only according to the love we bear him'" — that Irenaeus, 
"is certainly working towards" this ontology (p. 60). While it is true, as Farrow 
contends, that Irenaeus does not engage in systematic analyses of the nature of the 
human being in the terms of late antique philosophy, this does not mean that he has 
anything like the self-conscious adherence to the Zizioulian metaphysic of person-
hood that Farrow attributes to him. 
Furthermore, Farrow provides no explanation of what he means by the word peri-
choretic, a word first used in doctrinal reflection in the fourth century of the relation 
between the human and the divine in Christ and later used in trinitarian reflection, but 
25. JOrgen MOLTMANN, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God : The Doctrine of God, London, SCM Press, 
1981. 
26. Catherine LA CUGNA, God for Us : The Trinity and Christian Life, San Francisco, Harper, 1991. 
27. For instance in his recent, Colin GUNTON, The Triune Creator : A Historical and Systematic Study, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998. 
28. Sarah COAKLEY, "'Person' in the 'Social' Doctrine of the Trinity : A Critique of Current Analytic Discus-
sion," in Stephen DAVIS, éd., Daniel KENDALL, Gerald O'COLLINS, The Trinity : An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium in the Trinity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 123-144. 
29. Harriet HARRIS, "Should We Say that Personhood is Relational," Scottish Journal of Theology, 51 (1998), 
p. 214-234. 
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which has been applied to the human sphere in recent theology.30 It appears that what 
Farrow means by it, as his comments about the Spirit and man referred to above 
suggest, is mutual interpénétration ; but how and in what way this interpénétration 
takes place he does not say, beyond citing passages from Irenaeus in which Irenaeus 
remarks that there is a mutual rejoicing among figures separated in time such as 
Abraham, Simeon, Mary and the angels. The question of where the body fits into this 
is not addressed. Farrow, however, can conclude that the "doxological worldview," 
traced out along trinitarian lines, which results from Irenaeus' relational ontology and 
is grounded in the perichoretic power of the Spirit, is "essentially a eucharistie model 
of reality" (p. 66). 
It is puzzling that the terms used in the description of what we are to take as the 
high-point in the history of Christian reflection about the nature of the church, a high-
point based on what Farrow considers to be the high-point in thinking about the 
ascension, should have been left so vague, and, to the extent that they are understand-
able, that it should not be acknowledged that they reflect a particular set of modern 
assumptions. While it is the case, as Farrow contends, that Irenaeus' thought is less 
dualistic than Origen and Augustine, that he is less given to metaphysically oriented 
doctrinal reflection than they, it is this blank-slate quality that allows Farrow to 
inscribe his Zizioulian conception of reality back onto Irenaeus. 
One of the ironies involved in Farrow's reading of Irenaeus is that the very theo-
logians on whom he Farrow is drawing for the notion of a relational ontology and 
perichoretic existence believe that these ideas arose from a much more highly devel-
oped doctrine of the Trinity, that of the Cappadocians, than is found in Irenaeus, a 
doctrine which entailed rather a great deal of metaphysically ordered thought and a 
doctrine that owed a very great deal to the theologians who wrote before them, Ori-
gen prominent among them. For all of his conviction that God was engaged in the 
world through his two hands and his affirmation that both the Son and the Spirit, 
distinct from the Father from the beginning of the created economy, were divine and 
equal to the Father, Irenaeus did not attempt to explain how it was that the two were 
equal to the Father ; nor did he say that the Son was eternally begotten ;31 nor did he 
explain how Christ's divinity was united to his humanity and thus entered into the 
world in a redemptively effective manner. We see no attempt on the part of Irenaeus 
to articulate what we find in Origen — the basis for saying that the Father and Son 
eternally delight in each other, which Athanasius was then to take up and define in 
30. For a brief discussion of the history of the term and its usefulness in contemporary writings about the 
Trinity, see David CUNNINGHAM, These Three Are One : The Practice of Trinitarian Theology, Challenges 
in Contemporary Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 180-181. 
31. Irenaeus does not say that God becomes compound in order to deal with the world, a position that Farrow 
believes would destroy his whole argument, but neither does be provide a basis for saying that God does 
not do so. Later theologians, such as Origen and Augustine, thought it essential that theology attempt to 
address the issue. One recent Irenaeus scholar, Dennis MINNS, Irenaeus, Washington, Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, 1994, p. 53, argues that Irenaeus "describes the operation of this Trinity in subordinationist 
terms," an assessment, which, judged by later standards of orthodoxy, is surely correct. While Farrow ac-
knowledges that questions might be raised about Irenaeus' treatment of a host of subjects, the Trinity and 
the incarnation among them, he excuses him on the grounds that he was a pioneer. 
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terms of love. For Augustine, it was only possible to think of creation and the church 
as both one and plural because of the eternal and mutual love between the Father and 
the Son, which is the Holy Spirit. Although many of those who take the Zlzioulian 
line reject Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity, as I have already observed, Irenaeus' 
"distinctive ontology" is not grounded in as rich a doctrine of the Trinity as most 
recent theologians think a coherent ecclesiology requires, or, indeed, as Augustine 
offers.32 
My purpose in this article has not been so much to defend the theologies of Ori-
gen and Augustine or to attack that of Irenaeus. Rather, it has been to show that what 
we have in Ascension and Ecclesia is a species of the reading of the history of Chris-
tian thought in which, in the interest of pursuing the course of one topic of impor-
tance, the significance of the development of other topics, and in particular here the 
doctrine of the Trinity, has not simply been neglected but, at least by implication, has 
been regarded as wrong-headed. There is, in Farrow's schema, not only just one 
figure to have gotten the doctrine of the ascension right, there is also only just one to 
have gotten his approach to the doing of theology right. Seemingly lurking in the 
background to Ascension and Ecclesia is an (Harnackian) rejection of a role for 
metaphysics in the formation of doctrine : the hero of our piece is the one who in-
dulged least in such a practice, the one who kept most immediately to the biblical 
narrative. Whether we are to accept that the metaphysical framework of theologians 
such as Origen and Augustine had ruinous consequences for the history of the doc-
trine of the ascension, and whether we are to accept that a metaphysic of relation and 
perichoresis is a better framework, it is necessary to recognize that the latter also is a 
metaphysic. We must not lose sight of the fact that theology cannot be written in a 
conceptual vacuum. The theologian's task is to employ those concepts that are most 
able to reveal the full range and depth of the God made incarnate in Jesus Christ, 
always aware that underlying those concepts are assumptions often not immediately 
obvious to her or him. At the very least, such a notion as "personal relations" are "the 
most fundamental and constitutive dimensions of creaturely reality" needs to have 
been explained and justified if it was to have been made the touchstone for the inter-
pretation of the Patristic authors critical to the book. Had Farrow done so, he might 
have been less prone to rely on a one-sided and dated approach to the interpretation 
especially of Origen, but also of Augustine, and his appreciation of Irenaeus might 
have been more realistic. 
32. It lies beyond the scope of this review to enter into an analysis of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. I 
shall simply observe that Moltmann could not have given such a rich treatment of the nature of relations 
and love as he does in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God had not Augustine written about the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the way that he did. 
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